军事革命的普遍化
《军事-娱乐复合体》章节:军事革命的普遍化,去读读网友提供全文无弹窗免费在线阅读。!
借助游戏带给人的情感体验及人们对军事革命技术的逐渐熟悉，《使命召唤》和其他类似游戏使新型美国式战争被更多人了解和接受。军事革命为电子游戏提供了多种题材，绝大多数获得成功的战争类电子游戏，都将五角大楼文件中对未来威胁及应对措施的描述作为设计游戏背景的基础。Infinity Ward等游戏开发商和育碧公司等游戏出版商着力打造仿真度高、互动性强的电子游戏，以给玩家带来引人入胜的超现实体验，并通过令人热血沸腾的情节和特效来巩固和扩大玩家群体。在这个过程中，上述公司不断借鉴国防部高级研究计划局、防务合同承包商和装备制造商的先进技术，将其作为游戏玩家在游戏过程中力量的来源，借此不断勾起玩家“升级”的渴望，从而获取个人地位和认可，并最终在虚拟的“反恐战争”中取得胜利。在我们所研究的战争类电子游戏中，设计者给予玩家战胜挑战不断通关的所有选择，无不带有军事革命中核心技术的影子。现代战争与军事革命的联系日益密切。
“9·11”之后，民众的思想几乎被“恐怖主义”及“反恐战争”所占据，军事革命成为日益扩大且利润丰厚的商业电子游戏及影视剧市场的重要题材。如詹姆斯·德·代元、罗杰·斯塔尔等人曾论述过，而我们也在第一章中介绍的那样，军事–娱乐复合体的诞生得益于美国军方在20世纪90年代中后期利用商业电子游戏技术开展培训及模拟训练。这些训练项目与军事革命都有着间接但不失密切的联系。后冷战时代，非对称作战在全球各地的叛乱活动和反恐行动中屡见不鲜。加强战场网络化建设，提升模拟训练技术，以使散布各地的作战分队能够从接受培训、准备作战的状态无缝转换到适应各类复杂战场环境的状态，这一过程对军事筹划而言极为重要。由国防高级研究计划局建设的军用虚拟战场系统就是其为军事革命做出的重要贡献之一。借助这一平台，各个级别的部队都可在仿真的未来网络化战场环境中接受训练。在第一章中，我们会阐述虚拟战场系统及新型商业游戏技术如何在构建“赛博空间复合型作战模式”中发挥了关键作用。“赛博空间复合型作战模式”是出自国防高级研究计划局的一个构想，其功能就是培训能够适应未来战争的作战人员。在第二章中，我们将分析在战争类电子游戏的发展历程中，有关未来威胁、军事技术及战略方针的各类建议是如何逐步融为一体的。其中我们将介绍军事训练及模拟游戏和战争类电子游戏所选择的不同发展道路。我们认为：军队的作战人员已经从“主要关注过往战争经验”转变为“痴迷于军事革命的技术、技巧和预判”。战争游戏使《四年防务评估报告》等官方文件中对未来战争的构想进一步形象化，有助于各方对未来可能面临的威胁形成一致意见，使各方对军方提出的资金需求及收益达成共识，从而使其更易在立法机构审批预算时获得通过。
在第三章中，我们将介绍军事化思想在娱乐界广泛传播的范围和程度；在这个过程中，娱乐界在描绘潜在威胁时开始出现预测未来的倾向，而不再是对过去事实的重现。在《媒体预演》一书中，理查德·格鲁辛认为这一转变的发生源于“9·11”事件。他指出：“9·11”事件给美国乃至全世界的消费类媒体文化造成了共同的创伤。为了避免这种创伤再次发生，媒体开始出现大量预测未来的内容，其目的就是如果未来真的发生类似事件，我们就不会处于毫无准备的境地。他提出：“媒体预演”的作用就是避免媒体世界中的人们再次经历“9·11”事件带来的那种全员震惊的局面，其采用的方式就是持续营造一种对再次发生恐怖袭击的低强度恐惧或焦虑心理。49 不管这种恐惧是借助媒体上对“9·11”恐怖分子形象铺天盖地的报道来传达，还是借助不断强调恐怖主义是重大现实威胁来传达，媒体都在通过让我们感受真实生活中出现概率不高的事情来提醒我们什么才是最重要的。媒体对未来的预演使我们逐渐形成了对未来威胁进行预测的潜意识。难以捉摸却又无处不在的恐怖威胁将受到控制，这种认识正是来自《使命召唤》《幽灵行动》《看门狗》等商业游戏，《24小时》《军情五处》等电视剧以及《勇者行动》《钢铁侠》等电影。上述娱乐产品使潜在威胁广为人知，在向人们展示其危害性的同时也提出了应对潜在威胁的可能办法。
在第四章中，我们将分析网络安全政策及大众媒体和电子游戏中对网络战的描绘，以此对网络战普遍化中产生的涉及多要素的话题开展案例研究。作为军事革命威力的代表及非对称军事行动的一股重要力量，网络黑客给了本文作者许多灵感，使我们能够写出既引起读者共鸣又紧跟时代潮流的内容。不管是远程接入他人手机、监控系统或执法机构的电子邮件服务器，还是劫持美国无人机实施网络恐怖主义行为，娱乐产品中都将黑客们描述成魔术师一般的人物，他们能随心所欲地接入和控制任何数字设备。我们还对美国网络战能力发展情况及国防高级研究计划局的“X计划”进行了分析，并认为娱乐产品中对黑客超常能力的描述，有着或明或暗的政策背景，这样做的目的就是促进对网络防御系统和应急平台的投资——虽然军方自身也想发展网络攻击能力。娱乐产品中对黑客能力的描述并不是为了反映现实，而是为了给未来的研发工作提供灵感。
在本书的最后一章中，我们的阐述将走出军事–娱乐复合体的范畴，而将目光聚焦到近期的一部受人欢迎的战争类电子游戏上。这部名为《特殊行动：一线生机》的战争类电子游戏一定程度上走出了以往战争游戏的窠臼。该游戏通过特效和叙事对“把暴力和娱乐融为一体”提出了质疑，游戏通过强调玩家的情感体验而颠覆了以往战争游戏带给人的杀戮快感。根据游戏规则，玩家们往往需要过关斩将才能打通游戏各个关卡，尽管这个过程带给人越来越多的负面情感体验。通过独特的设计，《特殊行动：一线生机》提供给人们一种超出军事–娱乐复合体范畴的战争游戏体验。
在本文中，我们将研究战争类电子游戏及影视作品在军事–娱乐复合体崛起的过程中所发挥的作用，尤其是战争类商业游戏、电视节目、电影在推动公众思想军事化方面所发挥的重要作用。我们认为：在“9·11”事件发生后，公众陷于潜在的恐怖主义袭击威胁及对伊拉克和阿富汗战争的恐惧之中，以当前及未来反恐战争和国土安全为主题的影视节目和游戏，迅速充斥各类大众媒体。在这种环境中，除了开展宣传活动和传播支持战争的思想观念之外，军方、五角大楼和白宫根本无法控制大众传媒中的各种舆论。事实上，在这段时期——尤其是在反恐战争久拖不决之后，对美国实施战争行为的批评乃至负面言论开始频频出现， 这也代表着支持反恐战争的浪潮正在日益消退。尽管无法通过控制媒体舆论来推行美国军方的价值观，对战争持批评态度的电影、游戏及电视节目也在不断出现，但大众传媒仍然发挥了推动公众思想军事化的作用。他们发挥这一作用的途径不是靠宣扬自己的主张，而是通过制造对武器系统、战术和技术的强烈情感体验——这些武器和技战术均与新型美国式战争相关。以反恐战争和未来战争为题材的电视节目、电子游戏及电影的存在催生了一个事实，就是“无论你是否支持无人机的军事化以及使用自动监视技术辨识潜在的恐怖分子，你都会在潜意识中接受：这些军事技术是我们当前开展战争的必要选择”。
注释
1J. C. Herz, Joystick Nation: How Videogames Ate Our Quarters, Won Our Hearts, and Rewired Our Minds (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997); Tim Lenoir, “All but War Is Simulation: The Military Entertainment Complex,” Configurations 8 (2000): 238–335; Tim Lenoir, “Programming Theaters of War: Gamemakers as Soldiers,” in Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security, ed. Robert Latham (New York: New Press, 2003), 175–198; Tim Lenoir and Henry Lowood, “Theaters of War: The Military-Entertainment Complex,” in Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century, ed. Helmar Schramm, Ludger Schwarte, and Jan Lazardzig (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 427–456; Ed Halter, From Sun Tzu to Xbox: War and Video Games (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006).
2James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media- Entertainment Network (New York: Westview Press, 2001); Stephen Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Greig de Peuter, Digital Play: The Interaction of Technology, Culture, and Marketing (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003); Robin Andersen, A Century of Media, a Century of War (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter, Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Roger Stahl, Militainment, Inc.: War, Media, and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010).
3Andersen, A Century of Media, 247–257; Stahl, Militainment, Inc., 106.
4David B. Nieborg, “Changing the Rules of Engagement—Tapping into the Popular Culture of America’s Army, the Official U.S. Army Computer Game” (MA thesis, Utrecht University, 2005); David B. Nieborg, “Training Recruits and Conditioning Youth: The Soft Power of Military Games,” in Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games, ed. Nina Huntemann and Matthew Thomas Payne (New York: Routledge, 2010), 53–66.
5Marcus Power, “Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post-9/11 Cyber- Deterrence,” Security Dialogue 38, no. 2 (2007): 271–288.
6Corey Mead, War Play: Video Games and the Future of Armed Conflict (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013).
7Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 77–79.
8Stahl, Militainment, Inc., 100.
9Stahl, Militainment, Inc., 101.
10Stahl, Militainment, Inc., 103.
11Andrew Hoskins, Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Continuum, 2004), 75.
12Stacy Takacs, Terrorism TV: Popular Entertainment in Post-9/11 America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 122–143.
13Stacy Takacs, Terrorism TV: Popular Entertainment in Post-9/11 America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 131.
14David L. Robb, Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors the Movies (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 286; Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002).
15Andersen, A Century of Media, 211–226.
16Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, Games of Empire, 116.
17Important treatment of tactical games and countergaming can be found in Ed Halter, “Islamogaming: The State of Gaming in the Muslim World,” PC Magazine 25, no. 23 (2006): 136–137; Rita Raley, Tactical Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Alexander Galloway, Gaming: Essays in Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
18Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, Games of Empire, 118.
19Takacs, Terrorism TV, 17–18.
20Giles Richards, “Call of Duty: Ghosts— Preview,” Guardian, May 25, 2013, https:// theguardian/technology/2013/ may/26/call-of-duty-ghosts-previewhirschberg.
21Andrei Dobra, “Call of Duty Delivers ‘Epic Realism’ and Awesome Moments, Activision Says,” Softpedia, September6, 2011, http://news.softpedia/news/ Call-of-Duty-Delivers-Epic- Realism-and-Awesome-Moments- Activision-Says-220365.shtml.
22Yves Guillemot, “A Statement from Yves Guillemot,” Ubisoft Annual Report (2009), http://ecobook.eu/ubisoft/ra2009uk/.
23Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
24For example, Metz and Kievit summarize one of the goals of RMA analysts as “providing a blueprint for technology acquisition and force reorganization”: Steven Metz and James Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1995, vi, http://au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/ssi/stratrma.pdf.
25William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), B-1.
26William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), C-1.
27William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), B-1.
28John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (1993): 141–165.
29William A. Owens, “The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems,” Strategic Forum 63 (February 1996): 1–6.
30Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare—Its Origin and Future,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (1998): 28–35.
31Mark Gunzinger, “Shaping America’s Future Military toward a New Force Planning Construct” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013).
32Andrew Krepinevich, “The Military- Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” (Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, 1992); Mark Gunzinger, “Shaping America’s Future Military toward a New Force Planning Construct” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013); Metz and Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs.”
33Andrew Krepinevich, Robert Work, and Barry Watts, “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003).
34Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 28– 29, http://history.defense.gov/Historical- Sources/Secretary-of-Defense-Annual- Reports/.
35Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003), https://foreignaffairs/articles/ united-states/2003-07-01/new-americanway- war.
36Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 31–32.
37Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network: The New Front Line of Modern Warfare,” Foreign Policy, February 22, 2011, http://foreignpolicy/ articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network.
38Owens, “Emerging U.S. System-of- Systems.”
39Nick Turse, The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Spies, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012).
40Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, “Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), x.
41William H. McRaven, “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special Operations Command, before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 6, 2012; Thomas and Dougherty, “Beyond the Ramparts,” x–xi.
42Jeremiah Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2.
43Jeremiah Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), ii.
44Jeremiah Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 13.
45Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman, “Almost 1 in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot,” Wired, January 9, 2012, https:// wired/2012/01/drone-report/.
46Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,”17.
47Steven Hoarn, “SOCOM Seeks Talos (Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit),” DefenseMediaNetwork, May 18, 2013, http://defensemedianetwork/ stories/socom-seeks-talos-tacticalassault- light-operator-suit/; Allen McDuffee, “Special Ops Uniform Will Transform Commandos into an Iron Man Army,” Wired, October 11, 2013, https:// wired/2013/10/ironman/.
48Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre–World War II Level,” New York Times, February 23, 2014, http:// nytimes/2014/02/24/us/politics/ pentagon-plans-to-shrink-army-to-preworld- war-ii-level.html; Nick Simeone, “Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure,” DoD News, U.S. Department of Defense, February 24, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=121703.
49Richard Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality after 9/11 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.